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Writing as Life Performed
Martin Parker Dixon
An anonymous and originless slice of popular wisdom counsels that life 
is not a rehearsal.1 If this slogan is to have any salutary effects upon those 
who have been so admonished, what concept of “rehearsal” is being 
referenced? And what presumptions about the nature of “life” today are 
thereby advanced? The fable of Groundhog Day notwithstanding, by this 
phrase we are given to understand that in life we have no second chances; 
we cannot prepare, shape, schedule and perfect life’s events in advance 
of their actual occurrence.2 What happens to us really happens; and the 
actions we take, our decisions and interventions, have genuine, concrete 
consequences. So, the implication is that we had better get life right.
Real life cannot accommodate the latitude of a mere rehearsal. The 
rehearsal is that safe place where one can make mistakes, fluff the lines – 
“corpse” – without ramifications: the public is not watching, and little 
is at stake. But real life has to be lived with unremitting urgency. Every 
moment must be seized: you will never have this day again, so live it 
to the full. We squander our days in unhappiness or listlessness, so our 
mode of life should be inimical to fear, hesitation, and suffering. The 
goal of living should be to amass a stock of personal happiness and 
positive experiences.
A more melancholy spirit can go on to ask: how real is this “real” life? 
Oscar Wilde quips that our real life is the one we do not lead. The com-
pulsion to get the most out of life might very well screen the fact that, 
despite our best efforts, it contains so very little. The Shakespearean 
tropes will suffice: with melancholy Jacques and Macbeth, we can 
bemoan the fact human life is a show, it is staged and predictable: at 
best it is scripted into its seven ages, at worst it is a tale told by an idiot. 
We are players upon a stage; we play roles in good faith and in bad; our 
being is for others. No, life is not even a rehearsal – at least a rehearsal is 
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relatively organized, at least in a rehearsal we can try things out, get to 
know one another, feel the potentiality of the role and of the complexi-
ties of the work. Come show time, the fun stops, the brave intentions 
have dissipated and the default positions take over: play it safe, keep 
the audience happy, be professional, and night after night the actors are 
locked into deadening patterns. We, too, play our minor roles at work, 
at home; our sexuality is a set of postures and quotations, we even desire 
as we believe others want us to desire. Our lives, as performances, are so 
much fakery and hypocrisy. Hence, perhaps, the nagging suspicions of 
modern alienation that one’s real life is elsewhere: in a counter-culture, 
an existential authenticity awaiting a decision, in personal enlighten-
ment, or as a citizen of a future utopia.
This way of reasoning from the premise of life’s emptiness and fini-
tude is not particularly new. In the thinking of the writer of the Biblical 
Book of Wisdom (probably a first-century BC Hellenic Jew attempting to 
land a few punches on Epicureanism) he exposes an inner relationship 
between hedonism and mortality. The “irreverent” (asebeiV) understand 
life to be “short and tedious” and are forced to conclude all we have are 
fleeting pleasures: “let us enjoy the good things that are present. … Let 
us fill ourselves with costly wine and ointments: and let no flower of the 
spring pass by us. Let us crown ourselves with rosebuds, before they be 
withered” (King James Bible, Wisdom 2.5–8). Ultimately, the “ungodly” 
draw these conclusions from the wrong premise: for God does not will 
death. Righteousness, wisdom, and hope – even Man as such – should 
be considered under the aspect of immortality (aqanatoV). The proper 
manner of living is to follow a path of righteousness, for righteousness 
is immortal, and righteousness ensures a worthy inheritance for later 
generations.3 The righteous know all about local trials and suffering – 
“as gold in the furnace hath he tried them” – but according to this logic 
at least, life qua life flourishes all the more within a supposition of eter-
nity (King James Bible, Wisdom 3.6).4 
Crucially, and in the midst of these transcendent concepts, the pur-
suit of Sophia – in the guise of an alluring female personification – is 
remarkably grounded. An archetypal pattern is evoked: the highest 
spiritual goals can be approached if, and only if, life is stabilized and 
regularized by a form of constant application, by a loving commitment 
to nurture, training, and discipline (paideia), which, by a trick of per-
spective perhaps, aligns the student to the vanishing point of perfec-
tion.5 Discipline is the medium by virtue of which one can be properly 
and consistently orientated to life’s central task. The rhetoric is the same 
when, in 1950, Heidegger writes to a “young student” on the question 
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of the thinking of Being. The task of thinking the greatest of questions 
describes a faltering path and to “follow such paths takes practice in 
going. Practice needs craft. Stay on the path, in genuine need, and learn 
the craft of thinking, unswerving, yet erring” (Heidegger, Poetry 184).
These hasty observations are attempting to trail the preoccupations 
of this chapter: namely, to explore the interrelatedness of practice, 
rehearsal, and performance and their applicability in the domain 
of “life.” These relationships are complicated when, in reference to 
Adorno’s Minima Moralia, the content of critical-essayistic production 
(which is analogous to aesthetic production in many ways) is ultimately 
that of the life of the author. I propose that to a large extent, the cat-
egories of practicing, rehearsing, and performing that are derivable 
from artistic-productive experience can be extended to lived experience. 
Working and living seriously and critically have significant points of 
convergence. What I attempt to disrupt is the presupposition of any 
“natural” hierarchy between these categories, whereby, for example, 
performance – connoting the tangible accomplishment of goals and 
the visibility of that accomplishment – takes precedence over the open-
ended tasks of practice and rehearsal. In essayisic mode, I am interested 
in loosening the arrangement and priority of these categories and in 
evading finality and talking up the lesser partner in a litany of dualisms 
that subtend our judgments: seriousness/play, public/private, realized/
unrealized, commitment/postponement, decision/indecision, planned/
unplanned, action/delay, success/disappointment. 
Of course, inasmuch as the “art” of anything – music, motorcycle 
maintenance, ballroom dancing, or, again, living – conceptually com-
mits agents to attaining some kind of specific result through deliberate, 
practiced, action, accomplishment is never far from the essence of the 
matter. But, equally, the failure to realize intentions or the produc-
tion of unintended but desirable outcomes, remain a possibility. Even 
so, in artistic-productive contexts, judgments regarding the success of 
the work might be thoroughly provisional – success is dependent on 
external criteria and prior intentions, both of which the work itself 
might be transforming. When Ernst Bloch writes “what is true is that 
each and every criticism of imperfection, incompleteness, intolerance, 
and impatience already without a doubt presupposes the conception 
of, and longing for, a possible perfection” (Utopian Function 16) he is 
justified in insisting that criticisms of imperfection – which are routine 
for the artist and writer – must presuppose a longing for a possible 
perfection, but the logic of artistic processes also teaches us that per-
fection is a moving target. In another sense, the dissatisfaction with 
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the work (which stimulates revision, as I discuss below) is not neatly 
circumscribed by Bloch’s form of determinate negation and is not, if 
I may, particularly stimulating or helpful for artistic work. The “long-
ing” for perfection needs a medium, a substance, and a locus for any 
possible accomplishment. Perfection needs to appear as a possibility 
for the artist by virtue of the contributions of a sure technique, sound 
materials, and realistic intentions. To speak oxymoronically of “consum-
mate failures,” artistic productions that fail to realize extraordinary, yet 
worthy, goals, and judge these as superior to works which fully achieve 
what are only meager ambitions, would, similarly, respect Bloch’s logic. 
But if misused, making a fetish of fragments and failures eclipses the 
basic task to get control of artistic means. To do this, one must know 
something of success. While it can be accepted that worthy and remark-
able failure is on the very far side of genuine competence, there is a sense 
that in the following, failure is treated prosaically and its significance is 
de- emphasized. Failure, insofar as it can be proven at all, is an everyday 
matter of artistic production and writing, and, as it happens, living. 
*
By way of illustration, I would like to set out some distinctions between 
my thinking on performance and Austin’s concept of the performative, 
for the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Simply put, while 
a performative utterance for the most part requires a performance, a 
performance is not a performative. And because it is performed, it is also 
subject to processes of practice and rehearsal. My complaint is that only 
from certain points of view can rehearsal and practice be disregarded. 
Take the paradigmatic case of the “I do” of the marriage ceremony. 
In point of fact, it is acceptable to assume that in a significant num-
ber of cases the delivery of the paradigmatic performative, the “I do” 
and associated vows of the marriage ceremony, have been thoroughly 
practiced and rehearsed prior to the occasion of their actual performa-
tive utterance. In a state of rehearsal, such that while every action and 
utterance of the rite could be in place, in the absence of all actual, 
binding perlocutionary effects, what takes place remains only a pro-
cedural outline. However sincere or committed the agents might be 
during a walk-through, without the panoply of guests, witnesses, 
counter-signatories, the binding dignity of ritual, and the solemnity of 
an appointed hour; in short, without the means to correctly complete 
the procedure, nothing of the ponderous social power of marriage is 
manifest. The words are, as Austin put it, “hollow,” as hollow as those 
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uttered by actors on a stage, since no actual binding contract of fidelity 
will be effectuated by saying them in a state of rehearsal.6 But taking 
the externalized view of the theorist affronts the work being done by 
the agents concerned. Rehearsing this utterance need not be a hollow 
experience for the person that says it. It brings the event of marriage 
that little bit closer to “reality,” and all the while the prospect of the 
ultimate perlocutionary impact of what is said hangs before the speaker. 
Practicing the ceremony of marriage remains a serious undertaking. 
The nerves of the occasion have to be confronted and defeated if the 
ceremony is to pass with elegance. The presiding official can give useful 
direction – speak up, turn here, remember to breathe: from the point 
of view of the agents involved, to some extent, the marriage ceremony 
is choreographed like a theatrical event. Perhaps those involved wish 
the words to be said with sincerity, with confidence and clarity. These 
niceties hardly matter to the power of the performative. The “I do” is 
a signal to permit all the tremendous exterior legal, psychic, and social 
forces associated with marriage to do their work and demarcate a point 
of no return such that no one is deemed married without having under-
gone a certain procedure. In terms of performativity, the happy couple 
is not required even to mean what they say, or say it in any particular 
way, only that they say it and have been witnessed as saying it. 
Actions, deeds, and performances, whether with words or without, 
often require practice and rehearsal. Accepting the position of Judith 
Butler, who “argues that performativity is a kind of “citational practice” 
by which sexed and gendered subjects are continuously constituted,” 
such practice would presumably involve all the hesitant false starts, 
mistakes and corrections that are proper to any practice (Hollywood, 
“Performativity” 94). The course of any efforts made to performatively 
constitute sexuality need not run smoothly, but more importantly, a 
theory of the performativity of gender could perhaps benefit from a 
description of gender formation as rehearsed rather than finally attained. 
*
Adorno was open in his acknowledgment of the “rehearsed” moment 
in his writing. He relied on a devising process of first rehearsing ideas in 
dictation, and then subjecting the accumulated notes to cycles of editing. 
The chief criterion of the editing phase is not to second-guess the response 
of the reader, but to ensure that the written presentation is doing justice 
to the subject matter, the object. It is in relation to this subject matter 
that writing can be thought of as a performance, a performance of justice, 
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of honoring the subject matter. If the subject matter is the writer’s own 
life, then reflective, biographical writing like that of Minima Moralia is 
also a performance of that life, bringing, at an appointed moment, the 
flux of lived experience into a cogent,  significant form. 
Justice is served as writing struggles to approach its final form through 
stages of editing and re-writing. Writing anything of any consequence 
entails inevitable false starts, revisions, editing, and deletions. First 
thoughts seldom remain convincing for long and only a little while 
later what looked like a striking insight, or an incisive turn of phrase, 
is scored out with embarrassment. What occurred during the interval 
is something like the coming to prominence of the objective spirit of 
the text. The relief of having got something down on paper dissipates 
quickly, and the overt, concrete sense of what was actually written must 
be discerned from the text itself and not from the hopes of its author.
In a surprising piece of Gothic, one passage of Aesthetic Theory named 
this objective spirit an Irrlicht, the erring-light of folklore that haunts 
marshlands and lures lonely travelers off the straight and narrow. The 
objectivity of the text is never nailed down; rather, it lures the writer 
into pursuing its further development, but “without any guarantee that 
the productive forces – the spirit of the artist and his procedures – will 
be equal to that objectivity” (38–39). No guarantees, certainly. But nei-
ther can the writer do without his productive force, or more narrowly, 
“procedures.” If not delivered all at once at midnight in a Faustian pact 
(such rumors surrounded the likes of Paganini), the productive forces of 
the writer will have been shaped and strengthened in another kind of 
pact: the pursuit of an elusive objectivity in the text. This amounts to a 
permanent apprenticeship in writing.
The same passage continues: “The risk taken by artworks participates 
in their seriousness; it is the image of death in their own sphere” (39). 
Extending this idea, we can suppose that a performance of an artwork 
also knows something of risk: namely, will the performing artist be 
equal to the task?
The prefix per- in “performance” implies the taking of something 
through to completion. In the context of art, performance is not only 
the successful completion of the work of art; the performance takes place 
against the possibility of failure. It is not the being-seen, the presence of 
the audience, that makes the performance. Rather, the presence of the 
other enforces the rules that constitute the actuality of live performance: 
don’t make mistakes, no second chances, keep going, don’t squander the 
moment. (This pressure can be recreated alone.) In live performance, the 
Irrlicht of objectivity haunts only the actual moment, the consistency – or 
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logic – of anticipation, response, unfolding, balancing, placing, coloring. 
Fail this actuality and it can be said: “I died out there.”
Training, rehearsal, practicing, sketching, note making – these are pri-
vate, preliminary activities, and none seems to expose the artist to risk. But 
for the writer, to remain forever revising a text, to have second thoughts, 
doubts, reflections, edits, is to be forever scrambling textual objectivity; 
the objective demand of the text can never appear. To only rehearse is to 
risk impotence. Writers reach a point of no return whereby they perform a 
nonrepeatable, singular action: they give the text over, in its imperfection, 
to the risk of standing alone and being read as such. The placing of the 
text outside writerly productive force can only be a decision, a spontane-
ous resignation; not finished, but abandoned, as Paul Valéry’s saying goes. 
*
We read often enough: 
The meaning of Adorno’s thought cannot be fully comprehended if 
one concentrates simply on content at the expense of form. Adorno 
strove for a consistency between the style of his writings and their 
themes. The structure of many of his works enact his concern with 
the development of repressive systems of thought and organization. 
(Held, Introduction to Critical Theory 210–211) 
This is hardly an insight. It only repeats what Adorno wrote explic-
itly regarding how his texts were put together, and why. While form 
in Adorno’s writing does not receive the attention it might deserve, 
it would be absurd to dispute the view that Adorno’s writings do (or 
attempt to do) critical work in and through their form, presentation, or 
“composition,” as well as their overt content. 
An analytical approach to Adorno’s essay form is certainly conceiv-
able, and might be welcome, but in the meantime the temptation to 
aestheticize his writing in general terms is strong. Again, Adorno has 
led the way, and accelerated speculations by crossing between media: 
comparisons circulate between the composition of a critical text, poetry, 
and (especially atonal) music.7 Rich metaphors chase their tails in sug-
gestive ways: asserting simultaneously the “musicality” of language and 
the “grammar” of music. 
All of this can be raked over repeatedly, but there is no expectation 
that a commentary on Adorno should ever be written to similarly test 
the sensibilities, or “musicalize” its language, constellate its ideas, or 
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bring its dialectics to a standstill. One wonders how often one can be 
reminded in theory of the vital co-dependency of form and content in 
a text before we yield to the temptation to honor this theory by perfor-
mance in our own writing. There are plenty of means for keeping the 
devil at bay: shall we talk about praxis some more? Shall we look at the 
form and content issue from another angle? Shall we organize a confer-
ence or a round table? Shall we rehash the arguments again and again 
without ever asking of ourselves, can I write like that? 
The forces that prejudice the nascent thought that form could respond 
to content are very great. The threat of being refused publication is real, 
and many scholarly scruples are wrapped up with this refusal when it 
comes, not least the schoolboy shame of incompetence, of not having 
done your homework, and succumbing to pretentiousness. So many 
vanities and after-images of the instruments of academic repression, 
internalized over the years, and probably dished out in bad faith to sev-
eral generations of students. Worries strong enough to defeat most: you 
will never have read “enough,” any thesis could be toppled by another, 
stronger thesis at some later date. Your reader – stepping forth from the 
community of scholars – is professionally committed to be critical and 
dissatisfied, and will waste no time in expressing their “reservations” with 
what you have done. I must be failing the standards of objective knowl-
edge: so write nothing that falls outside the mood of severe defensiveness.
And then there is censorship through repletion. Arthur C. Danto iden-
tified up to 40 forms of philosophical-literary expression (hymns, sum-
mae, dialogues, tracts, lectures, confessions, etc.), which now have fallen 
from use (Danto, Philosophical Disenfranchisement 141). He describes the 
success of the scholarly article as a Darwinian survival of the fittest.8 
The well-argued scholarly dissertation has the monopoly. Texts that 
generate energy through presentation are rare. And form is never talked 
about as such, beyond the basic model of literature review-methodology-
analysis-conclusion. What other options are there? Is constellatory writ-
ing taught to students? Do we practice parataxis? Or even dialectical 
writing? Academic culture has generally prioritized overt content over 
presentation. Intensifying the relationship between presentation and 
content – dreaming of a philosophical prosody – is at best a spare-time 
activity. Something for the weekend, and not part of your professional 
duties. “Considerations that wish to take responsibility for their subject-
matter and therefore of themselves, arouse suspicion of being vain, 
windy, asocial self-gratification” (Adorno, Minima Moralia 196).
*
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In the face of a critical text that has disavowed standardized presenta-
tion and conventional tone, responses could be interpretative or appre-
ciative (what does it mean, how sophisticated, how clever), or praxial. 
Ask, how is it done? The desire is to become equal to the text by being 
able to rewrite it.
The practical causes embarrassment. As does the “great work,” it 
intimidates and presupposes the inadequacy of the admirer. The exqui-
site portrait, the late Beethoven Piano Sonata, the prose of Walter 
Benjamin or Beckett, all are – always, already – beyond emulation; the 
work of a master is so far beyond the scope of any possible praxis, it is 
futile even to attempt to even acquire some of their technique. 
Whatever vain or fugitive fascination took hold of works and tried 
to bring them closer, that tried to steal some of their power, can be 
punished twice over by forcing it through an utterly alien medium: 
the scholarly article, the dissertation, the commentary, and by subject-
ing the mind to new disciplines, no less exacting, but remote from the 
disciplines of artistic technique. In the scholarly context, self-denial, 
the taking of pains, painstaking attention to detail; these get their just 
rewards. But the expertise acquired is quite other to that dreamed of in 
the first pulsions of artistic enthusiasm.
Being too quick to embrace the grammar of toil – the honor, the debt 
to the masterwork, and the master – it is easy to overlook the possibility 
that a competence, something that adds to my capacities and powers, 
might be acquired happily, pleasurably, delightfully. Gilles Deleuze puts 
his finger on something:
I think it is very difficult to do philosophy if you do not have a kind of 
terminological certainty. Never tell yourself that you can do without it, 
but also never tell yourself that it is difficult to acquire. It is exactly the 
same as scales on the piano. (Cit. Conway 134. Taken from Deleuze’s 
unpublished seminars on Leibniz.)
Philosophy is difficult without grasping the key concepts, but acquiring 
competence in the use of those concepts is just a matter of practice and 
repetition. The bathos of this observation cuts the task down to size: do 
your scales, and in doing so, seize some productive power for yourself. 
Deleuze is perfectly serious about this analogy: “The history of philoso-
phy can only be created by philosophers, yet, alas, it has fallen into 
the hands of philosophy professors, and that’s not good because they 
have turned philosophy into examination material and not material for 
study, for scales” (Conway, Gilles Deleuze 135). 
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Of course, scales are something of a chore, but they cannot be passed 
over. But neither are they difficult. They are central to the development 
of musical productive power, and prepare one for the moment of perfor-
mance. Does one perform scales? Few would think the scale is material 
for performance; they are material for examinations. But a great deal is 
at stake in a scale since they describe almost all of music: line, tonality, 
rhythm, tempo, tone, articulation. Acquiring these curious powers, like 
having tactile confidence at the piano keyboard, or doing philosophy, 
can result from a certain kind of mundane application; though routine, 
with progress being made distractedly, privately, in loose, unscheduled 
parts of the day.
The opening gambit of “Gaps,” section 50 of Minima Moralia, is typi-
cal of many other of the essays in the volume: the worry is to do with 
the vulnerability of texts and thinking to heteronomous censure and 
deligitimization, and how it is that the writer might counter this poten-
tial repression of her thinking: 
The injunction to practice intellectual honesty usually amounts to 
sabotage of thought. The writer is urged to show explicitly all the 
steps that have led him to his conclusion, so enabling every reader 
to follow the process through and, where possible – in the academic 
industry – to duplicate it. (80) 
What is targeted is an imperative that lurks in society or the institu-
tion, and weighs upon the intellectual, slowly stultifying consciousness: 
conform! 
One could ask straight away: who does he mean? Who imposes this 
injunction? When? Why make generalizations about “every reader”? 
And why should an intellectual of Adorno’s caliber be so concerned 
with what society expects of him? (What is wrong with the Nietzschean 
strategy – appropriated by Roland Barthes at the beginning of The 
Pleasure of the Text – “Looking away shall be my only negation”? (3))
It is manifestly the case that in Minima Moralia Adorno adopted a tac-
tic of announcing prohibitions as a foil to his dialectical interpretations 
of the plight of subjective experience. It is not important how “real” 
these prohibitions are, or how specifically they are contextualized. 
Perhaps they are straw men. But this shadow boxing is psychologically 
plausible – therapeutic even. First, it is not such a straightforward thing 
to disentangle what you want to “say” from what everyone else (the 
Other) expects you to say. I allude to Lacan’s “che vuoi?” Your desires 
have been thoroughly conditioned by encounters with the desires of 
Writing as Life Performed 215
others. The “profession” expects explicit argumentation and academics 
expect it of themselves. 
Yet explicitness of thought is not a crime or a philosophical or writ-
erly error: it is only a problem when certain values dominate a culture, 
or exert a psychological and moral pressure on the writer at the expense 
of what is thought. By stealing the master signifier of “intellectual 
honesty” away from the Other (academics who are supposed to know 
what it means and administer scorn on those that fail), it starts to ring 
hollow, it is without a referent, and can therefore become the opposite 
of itself: the esteemed model of explicit – logically precise –  exposition 
of thought is actually a lie, the order of our thoughts is a tangle, a 
mish-mash of hunches, half-understood experiences, and speculations. 
“Rather, knowledge comes to us through a network of prejudices, opin-
ions, innervations, self-corrections, presuppositions and exaggerations, 
in short through the dense, firmly-founded but by no means uniformly 
transparent medium of experience” (Adorno, Minima Moralia 80). If the 
other wants intellectual honesty, it can have it. But it will read more like 
a diary of a hysteric than Spinoza’s Ethics. 
Adorno’s formal “deviancy” as he deals with this issue is only appar-
ent. It does not arise from a fascination or obsession with what the Other 
deems permissible, only to derive pleasure from some crafty trespass of 
convention. The master signifier of intellectual honesty – and those that 
identify with it – is symptomized: it is a product of a fantasy and it pro-
duces an inhibition: it “invokes the liberal fiction of the universal com-
municability of each and every thought” and it “inhibits their [thoughts’] 
objectively appropriate expression.” The injunction is primed from the 
outset for a symbolic re-ordering; a new priority can be discovered from 
the texture of the old fantasy. A new criterion of “objectively appropriate 
expression” now takes a stand. Immediately one can say that one form 
of writing that can never be “objectively appropriate” is the cliché or the 
banality: “For the value of a thought is measured by its distance from 
the continuity of the familiar” (Adorno, Minima Moralia 80). An honest 
thought is expressed in a manner that fits the thought itself; and the 
thought, if it is to be valued, cannot be more-of-the-same, a cliché wrung 
from the repertoire of pre-masticated, socially acceptable opinions.
Marked out here, under the sign of honesty, are the virtuous practices 
of the melancholy intellectual: have the courage to think differently, 
and make the form of what you write match the content. As Adorno 
kept insisting, the price you pay for achieving this will be that no one 
will want to listen to you, or if they do, no one will understand what 
you say. “A writer will find that the more precisely, conscientiously, 
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appropriately he expresses himself, the more obscure the literary result 
is thought, whereas a loose and irresponsible formulation is at once 
rewarded with certain understanding” (101). The standardization of 
presentation will lead to the standardization of thinking. A thinker will 
then only dare to think what can ultimately be lodged neatly inside a 
pre-approved presentational scheme.
*
One further line of enquiry is attractive: if for one moment the writer 
stopped worrying about making her reader happy (if your reader is 
happy, you have failed thought), how is the task of writing to be 
reformulated? Genuine thinking is coextensive with an investment 
in writing, in rhetorical and grammatical sophistication, in articulacy, 
in testing textual economies. This is how the modernist philosopher 
becomes a writer, or, if the term “writer” sounds a little too broad, at 
least becomes pre-occupied with writing. And this is why the micro-
genre of “advice to the writer,” usually delivered in the ancient idiom 
of sententiae, belongs properly to the oeuvre of both Adorno and 
Benjamin. How down to earth it sounds: 
A first precaution for writers: in every text, every piece, every para-
graph to check whether the central motif stands out clearly enough. 
Anyone wishing to express something is so carried away by it that he 
ceases to reflect on it. Too close to his intention, “in his thoughts,” 
he forgets to say what he wants to say.9 (Adorno, Minima Moralia 85)
As a genre, such advice is not the proverb of common parlance, an 
anonymous and ideological assertion of “how it is,” but is obviously 
the product of a relatively specialist, learned activity. As such, one could 
detect a degree of irony here, a countering tactic, whereby sayings of 
the same linguistic tone of stand-alone, portable, popular, and multi-
valent wisdom, are laid out for the benefit of those isolated souls that 
are caught up with the sphere of critical reflection and writing, and are 
trying to seize hold of some fleeting moments of authenticity outside 
the commonweal. But the form is a risky one in that it can all too read-
ily produce aversion: Polonius’s famous speech of farewell to Laertes in 
Hamlet, while full of good sense, is also a father lecturing his son and 
wisdom of this sort could justifiably occasion Oedipal rage.
The sententiae style is not only antique, it also seems to fall foul of 
Adorno’s own preoccupation with the necessary incommunicability of 
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genuine thought. While concentration and incisiveness in philosophi-
cal writing (demonstrating a trust in one’s thinking and in words) can 
lead to a density of expression that makes the reader work, the same 
forces do in Adorno’s oeuvre yield on occasion, neat, compact, and reso-
nant maxims that are the very model of easy communicability. 
These precepts – sometimes called aphorisms, but this seems to 
diminish their hectoring tone – work only for those that are already 
working. They conform to that register of intervention that comes from 
a teacher to a student, pithy, memorable, designed to get the student 
back on track or lift the work of the student to a new level. I recog-
nize this from the primal scene of the instrumentalist with her music 
 “master,” the correction of the performance, through startling insight 
into its deficiencies and inefficiencies.
The practical wisdom of the writer is not technical philosophy, but a 
quasi-proverbial consolation and stimulation to the work of the writer-
intellectual. Such sayings satisfy the principle (which, quoted out of con-
text, immediately looks like a slogan itself) “a good slogan should serve to 
energize practice” (Conway, Gilles Deleuze 19). True, providing one already 
has a practice to energize. For one who is struggling to write, who antici-
pates the scorn of editors or research assessors, whose papers are going 
awry, who is struggling to find focus, or an appropriate tone, Adorno’s 
words are rather energizing: do not be sentimental, look after all those 
devilish details, and beware the cost of distaining your own judgment: 
Should the finished text, no matter of what length, arouse even the 
slightest misgivings, these should be taken inordinately seriously, to 
a degree out of all proportion to their apparent importance. Affective 
involvement in the text, and vanity, tend to diminish all scruples. 
What is let pass as a minute doubt may indicate the objective worth-
lessness of the whole. (Adorno, Minima Moralia 86)
A more trenchant reminder to cross your ‘T’s comes from Fernando 
Pessoa: to “have touched the feet of Christ is no excuse for mistakes in 
punctuation.”
While Benjamin had a high regard for the tools and materials of 
writing (see The Writer’s Technique in Thirteen Theses, from One Way 
Street), the labor of writing is not in the first instance identified with the 
manual work of typing or penmanship – which can be considerable – 
but through a cyclical process of positing, disquiet, revision. But a gulf 
separates each of these stages. The cool, critical eye, or the editor’s finick-
iness, disguise the boldness of these initial risked articulations, those rash 
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words on which the perfecting of these texts depends. The editor-critic 
is a subsequent subject position that takes responsibility for the text’s 
perfection and discipline. A very revealing section of Minima Moralia, 
“Sacrificial Lamb,” gives an insight into Adorno’s practice of dictation: 
Dictation makes it possible for the writer, in the earliest phases of 
production, to manoeuvre himself into the position of critic. What 
he sets down is tentative, provisional, mere material for revision, 
yet appears to him, once transcribed, as something estranged and in 
some measure objective. He need have no fear of committing some-
thing inadequate to paper, for he is not the one who has to write it: 
he outwits responsibility in its interests. The risk of formulation takes 
the innocuous form first of the casually delivered memorandum and 
then of work on something already existing, so that he no longer 
properly perceives his own audacity. (212)
For many of his most important works, Adorno dictated his first 
thoughts to his wife Gretel.10 These articulations begin as an informal 
spoken rehearsal, with approval or censure arriving fairly immediately. 
The amanuensis will also bear the brunt of any feelings of hurt if the 
text is criticized. Adorno struggled to lessen his affective involvement 
in his own “supposedly sacred” texts, and Gretel’s role was to come 
between them. 
The responsibility for composing the text was to an extent distributed 
between himself and Gretel. The first enunciations are incomplete; they 
are prospective. They are thrown forwards, towards other subject posi-
tions – the critic-editor, the Other – who will at some future date make 
sense of them. Adorno did not “have,” in its fullness, what he had to 
say at the point of speaking. One starts to wonder after a while, how 
complete is this image of the writer? When Adorno uses the impersonal 
phrase “the writer” he cannot disguise for long the fact that Adorno 
means himself. This detached tone – derivable from the genre of the 
aphorism – demonstrates that the constitution and image of “the 
writer,” like the ego itself, is only to be derived from the Other. 
Consider the “wrath” that appears in the writer’s reaction to censure. 
In a Lacanian mode, we can notice that aggressiveness, however mild, 
spills out when fissures form in the ego, when the counterpart (the 
amanuensis) seems to demonstrate more composure and objectivity 
than the one who is supposed to be doing the philosophy. The phi-
losopher notices the incoordination of his own thinking, and at the 
same moment can react with hostility by imagining that the “last thing 
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I want is to be helped by you.” But in this same passage Adorno notices 
that bringing aggressivity into play has a beneficial effect on the work: 
it “benignly purifies his relation to his subject” (212). It lessens internal 
resistance; the writer will no longer “dig in his heels” (212). Suffice it to 
say that re-writing and editing, especially if forced by the unflattering 
opinions of another, can occasion painful feelings of disorientation and 
loss. The reduced scale of an Adorno essay, the pithy and taut construc-
tion, is perhaps not merely a stylistic choice, but a revenge for this loss. 
And it offsets his own potential dissipation. 
*
The English word “expression” has a powerful psychological note. The 
freedom to express oneself is healthy; it might be considered a human 
right. The German Ausdruck means that as well. But there is a mechani-
cal connotation also. For example, in Germany computer printers 
“express” A4 paper. 
Adorno was comfortable to cleave to the notion of expression. The 
word is a micro-theory of writing: it presupposes “having something to 
say” and the will to express it, the will to put that something out into the 
open. Expression implies a movement of inside-to-outside. And once “out 
there,” the intellectual’s “expressions” have to stand up on their own – 
survive scrutiny, suffer incomprehension, or otherwise love their fate. 
But the picture is not simple. To begin with, the “writer” (and certainly 
if the writer is a philosopher) is not simply one who happens to be writ-
ing, but one who, because of a commitment to thinking, is unusually 
committed to writing, is one who needs writing, and is accountable for 
what she writes. Serious writing is necessarily complicated by a master 
discourse. What I “have to say” is what I “have to say,” it is what I am 
obliged to say, what the other wants me to say or demands that I say. 
Those early efforts that are subsequently scored out, or deleted, might 
well be rejected because they resemble quotations too closely. The con-
structions do not yet stand out as themselves. But the objectivity of the 
text can be overstated; it can be adduced as doctrine. Certainly, the bur-
den of what I have to say is usefully distorted and resisted by the demand 
of the text, and by whatever intellectual or aesthetic features of the text 
are released and come into play in writing. But these demands, while 
objective, do not make the text an object. That is to over stabilize the 
text and counteract the vulnerability of the writer’s sense of identity.
Revision – as correction – eliminates all those “slips of the pen,” those 
errors that might give the lie to another dimension of what the writer 
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was saying but did not know she was saying. But perhaps revision can 
court parapraxis and ramify those errors at higher levels of construction. 
A less than adequate textual formulation is not necessarily supplanted 
in revision. A change of mind can be staged – performed, put on show – 
in writing via the rhetorical trope known as metanoia. The writer is 
entitled to correct herself, leaving the original undeleted alongside the 
supposed improvement, with both statements exerting an influence. 
The dialectical movement of a thought has this same quality. The sec-
ond thought that switches to a farther extreme does not defeat the first, 
the “dialectical procedure … makes statements in order to withdraw 
them and yet hold fast to them” (Adorno, Minima Moralia 212). Any 
text that is repeatedly worked over has some quality of a palimpsest. To 
retain all stages of editing, as if the text hoarded its excisions into a vast 
variorum, such might give transparency to thought. But the “guilt” of 
an unlegitimated thought is scarcely offset by making a parade of the 
thinker’s mistakes. 
Adorno made an analogy between the course of thinking, and the 
course of life. Life
[d]escribes a wavering, deviating line, disappointing by comparison 
with its premises, and yet which only in this actual course, always 
less than it should be, is able, under given conditions of existence, to 
represent an unregimented one. If a life fulfilled its vocation directly, 
it would miss it. Anyone who died old and in the consciousness of 
seemingly blameless success, would secretly be the model schoolboy 
who reels off all life’s stages without gaps or omissions, an invisible 
satchel on his back. (Minima Moralia 81)
A life which was lived “according to plan” would seem less than a life, 
oddly devoid of incident, and the account of life’s course is edited back 
to only those moments that suit the narrative demands of the Other. In 
a totally administered existence, the only acceptable life is the one that 
performs its conformity. The guiltlessness of a clean CV is of the same 
order as a neat proof from first principles: a form of strategic amnesia.
By contrast, the noble, sweeping forgetting of the past lets life “devi-
ate” from its assumed trajectory, take up a new course, a fresh start. 
Conversion of life, redemption, the self-overcoming that is affected 
when one changes one’s mind (metanoia) is not a forgetting. If guilt 
and shame propel one to make amendments to life, such are retained in 
memory, they are unforgotten, but the old order of existence no longer 
dominates consciousness; it persists as that old life that underwent 
renewal. To forget would be to risk returning to the old ways.
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Here is an account from an artist who could not shake the guilt of failure, 
a painter who had failed the performance principle of painting: externalize 
your interior vision. His failure is a falling short of the ideal; he knows – 
or remembers – what the ideal ought to be, but he cannot reach it. Talk 
of guilt arises naturally here: aʽmarti¢a, meaning “missing the mark,” is one 
of the Greek words for “sin.” The twentieth-century American painter 
Richard Diebenkorn reminiscences in an unpublished studio notebook:
I think that my necessity to work and rework a canvas in order to real-
ize it becomes a process wherein my ideas are externalized. I find that 
I can never conceive a painting idea, put it on canvas, and accept it, 
not that I haven’t often tried. As a young man I considered this ina-
bility a shortcoming – I felt my ideas (those that I brought from my 
head to an initial laying out on the canvas) were essentially banal. 
This of course may well have been/be true but however it is, almost 
from the beginning, I looked forward with relief to being able to cor-
rect, to set things right, and it was with something akin to guilt that 
I did so in the privacy of my studio … It was as though I’d failed in 
my performance but somehow was able to steal this second chance 
and thereby come up with something that I could set out with the 
works of my peers (which were of course first crack).
 Somewhat later, I did realize that the arts of painting, writing and 
composing music were intrinsically activities that partake of revision 
… Later yet I began to feel that what I was really up to in painting, 
what I enjoyed almost exclusively, was altering – changing what was 
before me – by way of subtraction or juxtaposition or superimposition 
of different ideas. I should also admit to a modicum of guilt in this 
instance too in that I felt that what was becoming my painting process 
was a wholesale proposition and that my initial intent, as well as intent 
in process, was reduced to simply making things right. (Livingston, 
Richard Diebenkorn 72) 
In this instance, revision is the core technique and the shame of the 
artist. Revision is proof of the failure of his basic performance, his failure 
to hit the mark at the first attempt, or only to hit a mark that, in its 
banality, was not worth hitting. Revision is the shameful (secretive) 
performance of recompense, or perhaps that of concealment. The last 
phase of this guilty admission was that his intentions for his work had 
become wholly non-specific, just a matter of “making things right.” 
Diebenkorn had also missed his vocation.
Each section of Minima Moralia ends with a well-turned cadence. They 
close themselves off so poignantly. The damaged life that is performed 
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in that collection can still affect a flourish of insight. The pressure to 
cadence is felt here also, but, and this is the one moment when this 
writer mentions his life, I do not have Adorno’s brilliance. I will miss the 
mark, but am strangely glad of it. For it means that I need to get back 
to the material, to practice, root out as many procedures as I can, and 
work through them, quietly and unnoticed.
Notes
 1. I gratefully acknowledge a Research Grant from The Carnegie Trust for the 
Universities of Scotland which greatly facilitated my work on this chapter.
 2. The short story The Secret Miracle by Jorge Luis Borges also entertains the 
notion of the mutability of time, in this case, a divinely contrived suspen-
sion of actual time for a writer sentenced to death. He is taken out before a 
firing squad at which point time is frozen and he is granted an extra year 
to complete – in his imagination – a play. As the last words fall into place, 
normal time is resumed and the execution is carried out.
 3. In marked contrast to the prospects of the heathens: “But the multiplying 
brood of the ungodly shall not thrive, nor take deep rooting from bastard 
slips, nor lay any fast foundation” (King James Bible, Wisdom 4.3).
 4. A theological register is extremely important in framing the utopianism of 
Ernst Bloch. For both Bloch and Adorno, the abolition of human death was 
the key determinant of utopian thinking. See, for example, their exchanges 
in the interview “Something’s missing”: “Utopian consciousness means a 
consciousness for which the possibility that people no longer have to die does 
not have anything horrible about it, but is, on the contrary, that which one 
actually wants” (Bloch, Utopian Function 8).
 5. “For she goeth about seeking such as are worthy of her … and meeteth them 
in every thought. For the very true beginning of her is the desire of disci-
pline; and the care of discipline is love” (King James Bible, Wisdom 6.16–17).
 6. W.B. Worthen for one takes issue with what he calls “Austin’s cavalier dis-
missal of theatrical performatives – hollow to whom? in what sense?” (See 
Worthen, “Drama” 1095).
 7. See for example Gillespie, “Translating Adorno.”
 8. “It is arguable that the professional philosophical paper is an evolution-
ary product, emerging by natural selection from a wild profusion of forms 
Darwinized into oblivion through maladaption, stages in the advance of 
philosophy toward consciousness of its true identity, a rockier road than 
most. But it is equally arguable that philosophers with really new thoughts 
have simply had to invent new forms to convey them with, and that it may 
be possible that from the perspective of the standard format no way into 
these other forms, hence no way into these systems or structures of thought, 
can be found.” (Danto, Philosophical Disenfranchisement 142) 
 9. The German title for this section is Hinter den Spiegel. 
10. See Müller-Doohm, Adorno 57.
